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The purpose of this thesis is to consider the applicaticn of
organization developient theories and models to the organi-
zations in Thailand, particularly in the public sectcr. The
physical background cf the country, national economy and
seme characteristics of Thai people, which, from the
author's perspective, have significant influence or. the
elements cf the models and theories of organization develop-
ment are described. The barriers of planned change in Thai's
cuolic sectcr are alsc described. A recommended strategy to
improve the effectiveness of the organization develop ment
process and the efficiency of knowledge utilization within
the ccuntry is proposed. The anticipated improvement of
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I- INTRO DP CTIOS
Organization development varies from one organization to
other depending upon its own structural and procedural
factors, characteristics of the country and the people.
Organization development continues to gain ascendancy as a
preferred strategy for improving the performance of indivi-
duals, groups and organizations. It is one of many
technologies of planned change, and one that is being
applied in organizations around the world. Organization
development is a data-based, problem-solving, system-
approach process for assisting organization members to
become mere competent in thsir present work lives and also
to develop the skills and knowledges to meet the future
demands and exigencies competently.
This is accomplished primarily through organization
members learning hew to manage collaborate!/ the organiza-
tion's culture and process. Based on theories and principles
of the behaviorial sciences, this applied discipline repre-
sents an inportant strategy for building and maintaining
viable organizations in an age of increasing the goodness of
fit between the individual and tne organization.
Thailand is a developing country which needs an effec-
tive utilization of technologies to manage her existing
resources and to develop her own organization. By the and of
the nineteenth century, modern sys-ems of education and seme
western cultures were introduced into the country and had
great influences on the Thai people's of living and the
country as a whole. The people's ways of life have been
significantly changed since then the organizations within
the country, from the author's point of view, have been




could not be used effectively. The rapid urban population
increase has caused many social problems, resource crises,
"red tape"system in public sectors, and degradation in
quality cf life cf the people.
To overcome these problems, upgrading the average level
cf education of the feopl:: - n *he organizations is a worth-
while approach. But to take advantage of education, an
improvement in the organization development technologies
within the organization and among the organizations seem to
be an important sech^nism that should be considered.
Barriers to the organization development have resulted
from many causes. Shysiographical aspects of -he country,
national economy and characteristics of the people are among
the factors. Resistance to change is an important fact that
seems unavoidable and needs to be somewhat overcome in order
to create a successful change.
As wendeii I, French and Cecil H. Bell, Jr.; in
Organization Development state:
"In the behavicrial science, and Derhaps ideal, sense of
the tern, organization development is a long-range
effort to improve an organization's problem-solving and
renewal processes particularly through" a mors effective
and collaborate management of organization culture, with
special emphasis en the culture of formal work teams,
wrth the assistance of a. change agent, or catalyst, and
the use cf the theory and technology of allied
behavicrial science, including action research."
The authcr believes that the predictive model is prcp-
erly analyzed and applied to that organization it will help
solve the problems of an ineffectively organizational devel-
opment within the country and especially within the public




A- PHYSICAL BACKGROUND OF THAILAND
Thailand.The word literally means 'land of the free' ar.d
popularly evokes striking image of graceful temples, emerald
ricefields and lushly forested mountains. while accurate,
these images represent only a tiny fraction of the composite
Thai canvas.
Bordered by Malaysia to the south, Burma to the west,
lacs to the north and northeast and Cambodia to the east,
Thailand is approximately the size of Texas with a
population of 45.5 million.
The country is divided into four regions: the mountai-
nous North, where temperatures in the winter are ccol enough
to permit cultivation of temperate fruits such as apples and
strawberries; the Northeast, a rolling, semi-arid plateau
vhich was once the center of Thai agriciuitur s; the Central
region, one of the most fertile rice-growing areas on earth;
end the isthmus cf the South, whose heterogeneous topography
encompasses hilly rubber plantations and fruit orch-
ards, ccves and bays filled with fish and rugged terrain from
which high-grade tin ore has been extracted for centuries.
Climate varies widely. Generally, temperatures range
from annual highs of 100 f to low of 66 f.The North experi-
ences winters where thermometer readings slightly above
freezing are net uncommon, whereas the far South is
completely tropical, with steaming rain fcrests kept lush by
daily thunderstorms through most of the year. This spectrum
cf tenicn regional climates allows year-round crop
cultivation. Figure 1.1 shows where Thailand is located.
Almost equidistant from India and China, and histori-
cally something of a Southeast Asian migratory, cultural and
religious crossroads, Thailand, known for centuries by
outsiders as "Siam", has been fasioned into a modern kingdom
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Figure 1.1 Map of Thailand.
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Importantly, Thailand is the only Southeast Asian
country never to have been colonized by the Western powers.
This urdcubtly accounts for its unique character, continu-
ally developed during more than 700 years of cherished
independence.
Althcugh Thailand is perhaps bast known as an agricul-
tural country, its 460 mile Indian ocsan seacoast and 1165
irile gulf of Thailand shoreline teem with marine life. Its
fishing fleet is the world 1 s seventh largest.
Heme of what many experts accept as the world's oldest
tronze culture civilization, Thailand has enjoyed six
millenia of cultural, social and economic evolution through
medieval intercourse with countries as far afield as China
and Arabia, and subsequent trade with European powers.
Unhampered by racial or religious prejudice and aided by
a natural penchant for eclectically adopting values and,
through simplif icaticn and embellishment , making them unmi-
stakarly 'Thai' , Thailand has maintained a miformly high
level cf development throughout its history.
A predominantly Euddhist kingdom (with a unique style of
kingship), Ihailand tcday enjoys its own distinctive culture
(drama, architecture, literature, music, painting and sculp-
ture, casket and silk weaving, lacquerware, bronzeware,
jewellery and pctery) , its own language, its own cuisine,
its own martial arts, its own beliefs and attitudes. Thai
sculptors, architects and painters have contributed some of
the world's most expressive and enduring Buddhist art and




II- 1LUJSE fORCE, UNIQUE SYNTHESIS
Throughout: its long history, Thai culture has been nour-
ished ar.d shaped by a varaity of concepts. Some, like
Euddhism, have been imported and been adapted tc Thai forms.
Others, the routines of village life, for example , are
indigenous, and as far as we know have remained compara-
tively unchanged from ancient times. A third group,
including the Thai language itself and numerous art forms,
are hybrids in which an indigenous core has been enriched
and diversified by outside influences.
Over the centuries these forces have interlocked to form
a powerful, individual and complex culture which retains the
ability tc renew itself as the world changes and new devel-
opments exert their various pressures. The central concepts
cf religion, family and village structure, language and
artistic expression remain firm, but permit the Thai culture
they support to adept and develop into new forms and expres-
sions, hy understanding these concepts and their effect on
the way Thais perceive the world, it may be possible to
comprehend where the country's multi-fold culture cam*2 from,
where it is now, and where it is going.
A. RELIGION
Pressnt-day spiritual society is composed cf dissimilar
ingredients: thousands of Theravada monasteries and over a
quarter of a million monks; an ubiquitous belief in spirits
and ghosts; corresponding interest in astrology, palmistry
and the occult; Brahman rites and ceremonies, confined
mainly tc the royal courts; and Mahayana Buddhism,




substantial Chines*? population. Religious minorities of
Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Christians complete a rich
variety cf thought, philosophy, dogma, ritual, belief,
superstition, worship and endeavour that is fasicned iistc a
tolerant society with Buddhism as the dominant spiritual
factcr.
E. EODDHISH
Buddhism first appeared in Thailand during the third
century E.C. when missionaries dispatched by the Buddhist
Indian eirpercr Ashoke (267-227 B.C.) , visited Nakorn Fathom,
today a provincial capital and site of the world's tallest
Euddist icnument.
At its inception in 600 B.C. , buddhism had been a reac-
tion against Brahmanism, the major contemporary Indian
reiigicn which would later be absorbed by Hinduism.
Euddhism eschewed Brahmanism's emphasis on caste, en dogma
regarding sacrifice, ritual and its pantheon cf Brahma (the
Creatcr) , Visnu (the Fresever) and Shiva (the Destroyer). At
the same time, it medified Brahmanic concepts cf kana and
rebirtt.
Erahmanism answered the needs for formalized celebration
cf mac as higher being. Later, associated with the monarchy,
it provided ceremonies governing court etiquette, hierarchy
and ritual. Important aspects of Brahmanism touch every
present-day Thai. The traditional and formal Thai wsddina
ceremony is entirely Brahman in origin. Erahmans still
preside ever various royal Thai court rituals and Brahman
shrines can be fcund throughout the country.
Euddhism also made deep inroads into the animist beliefs
which had held sway in the Menam Chao Fhya basin. Despite
its popularity, it never entirely supplanted them. Through
animism cne could placate rampant, vengeful spirits.
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Euddhism, on the other hand, spoke to the individual's inner
being and provided him with direction in ordering his daily
life- More importantly, it gave an explanation for his exis-
tence and offered hope for a better life in future
incarnations.
Briefly, Buddhists believe that one's life dees net
begin with birth and end with death, but is a link in a
chain cf lives, each conditioned by volitional acts (karma}
committed in previous existences. The concept of karma, The
law cf cause and effect, suggests that selfishness and
craving result in suffering. Conversely, compassion and leve
bring cne happiness and well-being. Therefor?, only by
eliminating desire can one find peace of mind. The ideal
Euddhist aspiration is to attain perfection through Nirvana,
an indescribable, immutable state unconditioned by desire,
suffering of further rebirth, in which a person simply is,
yet is conpletely at cne with his surroundings [Ref. 1: p*
xi].
Later, the Thais moving southward from China similarly
embraced Euddhism, finding it physologically, emotionally
and intellectually satisfying. Moreover, Buddhism was easily
adopted because it did not conflict with animism or
brahianic ritual but fulfilled needs net addressed by
either.
Buddhisu gained wide acceptance because its emphasis on
tolerance and individual initiative complemented the
Thais'cherished inner freedom. Fundamentally, Buddhism is
an empirical way of life. Free of dogma, it is flexible
moral, ethical and philosophical framework within which
people find room to fashion their own salvations.
Through the centuries 3uddhism has been the main driving
force in Thai cultural development. Much of classical Thai
art, particularly architecture, culture, painting and «arly
literature, is really Buddhist art. Then as now, Euddhism
coloured everyday Thai life.
17

As Buddhism's benign influence spread countrywide, Thais
cf all classes subnitted to its moral authority. Thai
monarchs subscribed to the Buddhist ideals cf kingship found
in the original Theravada scriptures, while farmers serenely
accepted their station and fortune, or misfortune, as
logical karmic conseguences of previous lives.
With its emphasis on accepting human foibles and short-
comings as inevitable , Buddhism helped forge and crystalize
the Thais* remarkable tolerance and lack of prejudice, a
major factor which was to allow smooth, peaceful assimila-
tion cf captives during medieval Thailand's almost perpetual
conflicts with neighbouring countries. It also allowed the
Thais to embrace diverse cultural influences regardless cf
origin.
Responding to this openness to new ideas, European
missionaries could propragata their faiths in Thailand.
because Euddhism answered so many of people's needs, they
found few converts.
Although 3uddhism became the primary religion, Thais
have always subscribed to the ideal of religious freedom.
While Thai constitutions have stipulated that Thai kings
must be Euddhist, monarchs are invariably titled 'protectors
cf all religions'. Consequently, the government, through the
religious affairs department, annually allocates funds to
finance religious education and construct, maintain and
restore temples, mosques and churches.
18

III. DYNAMICS OF CHANGE
Through a millennium of evolution, from the -earliest of
tribal migrations ut: to the present, natural, physical,
human, cultural, religious and spiritual forces have served
as catalysts and modifiers ;o give Thailand its unique
national identity and bring about the prosperity and
security it enjcys t<:day.
A. OHIFYING FORCES
Iks early inhabitants were organized along tribal lines
with the headman, chosen for his leadership abilities, occu-
pying the paramount position. As a kingdom was consolidated
and expanded, the leader gathered advisers around him to
administer his territory, collect taxes and organize the
realm's defense. Th>;se advisors, often members of the lead-
er's cwn family, gradually evolved into the officials of the
Ayutthayan courts (Ayutthayan period: 1350- 1767) and, even-
tually, into the bureaucracy cf the central government »s it
exists today,
The sense of national unity necessary for administration
to fur.cticn smoothly, was enhanced by several factors. A
common language and literature gave a cohesion and singu-
larity that stamped en thais their sense cf uniqueness. A
common cede cf laws applicable to all regardless cf origin
strengthened the sense of oneness already brought about by
the relative racial homogeneity of the country's inhabitants
and helped to eliminate the internecine rivalries which




The emergence cf Buddhism in the Sukhothai period
(1238-1350) as the predominant religion strengthened this
unity. Thais 1 natural tolerance was enhanced by the
Euddha's injunction to accept others 1 viewpoints. As a
result, irircrity religions found fertile ground on which to
grow and religious differences never became divisive.
Euddhist tolerance fostered a sense of racial unity.
Many foreigners whc arrived to trade, settled permanently,
taking Thai citizenship and raising families. Most adopted
Thai name sc that by the second and third generations their
children were indistinguishable from those around them.
Today, it is difficult to identify a faca as distirctly
Thai.
It was from early leaders' understandable wish tc psrpe-
trate their rul€ thicugh their descendants that Thailand's
stable government emerged. The institution of Brahmanism to
legitimize authority also offered appropriate symbols and
ceremcnies cf government to which people could respcr.d posi-
tively. The necessary accoutrements of soldiers, courtiers,
a civil service and merchant class to serve them augmented
this cere and formed the basis for later social structure.
The close association between the ruling group, commercial
agents, religious leaders and military leaders continues tc
chracterize the Thai ruling structure today.
Though most peasants remained outside the power
structure-usually by preference as their stolid nature saw
politics as an unnecessary hindrance that interfered with
full erjeyment of life-the policies emanating from the capi-
tals had profound effect on their lives. The easy exchange
between city and ccuntryside persisted because it suited
both groups. Because of the ease of communication between
the capital and the farms there was a continual, fluid move-
ment between the twe areas so that nard lines cf social
democraticn never evolved. The city depended on the
20

countryside for its sustenance and rural men dissatified
with farm life had an outlet and a ready ladder of success
in city trades.
The emergence of the cities created new jobs. Bright
men, educated by village monks and seconded by headmen,
could easily find employment in the civil service. Those
skilled with their hands became the artisans and craftsmen
who build tha beautiful monuments and shrines gracing the
large towns. As the system of corvee labor was eliminated,
those without skills could occupy the idle farm seasons
working as laborers in the cities. Today, towns continue to
provide employment for country people seeking to better
their standards cf living.
Ibe Thai characteristics of resilience, national pride
and relief in strong leaders were put to the test with the
fall cf ayutthaya (1*767). Burmese armies swarmed over the
city, reducing it tc rubble and scattering its inhabitants
or carrying of the cream of its culture class tc i*s cwn
courts. Yet within 15 years, Thailand, its capital now
relocated to Bangkok for defensive reasons, emerged a
strong, viable entity, capable of dealing with outsiders or.
egual terms, easily repelling external invaders and
forwarding the development of its economy and society.
Ihe Thai trust in strong leadership was rewarded by a
succession cf able mcnarchs with the vision tc see Thailand
as a regional power and the ideas to move it in those direc-
tions. Continuing the traditions of Ramkamhaeng,
Earomtralckanart , Narai , Harasuan and Taksin, enlightened
Chakri kings introduced and modified foriegn ideas in an
effort tc modernize the country yet retain its cultural
integrity. Slavery was gradually abolished between 1874 and
1905 and a monetary reward for service was substituted.
With the freeing from physical thrall came the freeing of
minds. Educational opportunities were opened to all.
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Schools became -he rsponsibility of the government which
recognized that cnly by having a literate populace able to
participate in nation-building ccaid the country prosper.
An infrastructure of public roads, water-works, electricity
and hospitals were constructed on a national seals of
western lines.
The impetus to modernize came from the kings. Mcnarchs
also created the administrative infrastructures necessary to
develop natural resources and strengthen the economy.
Though the changes at the end of the 19th century came
rapidly they were initiated and implemented along orderly
lines.
E. NEW CHALLENGES
The reinst ituticn of true representative democracy in
October 1973 heralded new directions fcr the country.
Programmes initiated during that period are still having
considerable impact today. The new awareness demanded that
long-standing prcblens be resolve equitably and that those
sectors of the society formerly ignored be brought into
active participa ticn in the development process.
The main area pinpointed for improvement was the
neglected farming population. Huge budgets were allocated
to improve read and irrigation facilities in the villages.
Development was pursued on an integrated basis with teams of
experts comprised of engineers, health workers and agricul-
ture extension agents, discussing felt needs with villagers
and then tackling the problems in a coordinated fashion.
For the first time, farmers were consulted at the grassroots




A large part of the awareness of tha farmers' importance
was indicated by changing world economic patterns. The cil
price rises had boosted the cost of development for third
world countries and huge industrial complexes nc longer
seemed economically attractive. At the same time, world
population pressures and projected food shortages had made
food producing countries aware of the vital role they had to
play (Bef. 3: p. 37].
In Thailand, the early 1970s saw the beginning of a
shift away from the economically detrimental import-
substitution schemes to agribusiness with emphasis on
value-added food exports. Entrepreneurs began building
processing and packaging factories in the heart of country-
sides- Besides increasing the value of the area's produce,
the new industries had the added benefit of employing
laborers who might otherwise have gone to the city to find
jobs
.
The basic impetus for this drive is the same one that
has been responsible for progress in the past: the sense of
"Thainess" engendered by common origins, culture and aspira-
tions. The manifestations of that spirit can be seen in the
favor with which many of the problems which lie in the way
of tkailand's total development are being remedied in a
rational manner according to objectives laid out in
government plans.
With the nation's resources being used to bridge income
gaps, improve educational standards, check the birth rate
and relieve the pressures on the urban areas, Thailand is on
its way towards resolving the problems which have plagued it
for the past two decades. And in an equitable fashion,




IV* ggSPCNSES TO MODERN DEVELOPMENT
Cne of the phenomena of the 20th century has been -he
rapid social and economic development of what were ciassi-
T>V c can trie
s
fied as "underdeveloped agrarian" nations.
which had been colonies found themselves after world war 2
with the opportunities to shape their own destinies. Others
like Thailand, were independent entities which for centuries
had led quiet existences watching world affairs from afar
with little concern for matters outside their immediate ken.
In all cf them, economic activity was geared primarily
toward supplying their own needs.
But wcrld war 2 changed their perspectives. Increased
contacts between nations were creating a global community
encompassing the individual aspirations cf each nation.
Trade was the arbiter; raw materials flowed to the developed
countries in exchange for manufactured goods and new
products became available in the developing countries. New
ideas began to spread via radio and television. The concept
cf eccncnic participation on a wcrld scale offered new
possibilities for developing a country's basic economy and
with it to improve its people's standards of living.
In Thailand, as elsewhere, the alternatives to tradi-
tional life were enormously attractive, especially to these
in the cities which were in closest touch with western
lifestyles. Machines promised an easier life, higher
productivity per man hour and higher incomes for the
workers.
The first to take -he initiative was the city-base
private sectcr. Thailand's laissez-faire economy allowed
private entrepreneurs the freedom to utilize Thailand's
natural comparative advantages to their fullest benefit and
2<*

to build on the economic foundation established by the
nation's farmers. As a result, the 1960s and 1970s were
marked by rampant growth.
With the dynamic growth the cityscape began to change.
More and cars appeared on the roads, new building sprang up
everywhere and Eangkok began to spread out in ail direc-
tions. The opportunities for increased income lured
thousands of people from the countryside to work in the new
factcries and service industries. Their spending habits
began to reflect the new prosperity in dress, lifestyles ana
in the lissure-time industries -hat were growing to absorb
the excess wealth.
Throughout this period, government planners concentrated
en channelling this new industrial growth in direction bene-
ficial to the country. 3ecause of the high cost of imports
and the drain on foreign currency reserves they represented,
the government adopted a policy of import substitution, it
directed its first, second and third five-year development
plans toward establishing local factories to produce items
the ccuntry had formerly imported from abroad.
The new economic activity was a boon. It did much to
increase the standard of living and to modernize the country
at a pace that would have been unbelievable to Thailand's
first refcrmer, King Ch ulalongKorn (reigning: 1868-1910)
[Ref. U: p. 137]-
While the rapid growth was inevitable and a necessary
step in the country's development it brought a number of new
challenges in its wake. for one, it was primarily city
based which meant that the central plains, always the rice-
towi of the ccuntry, was the area to benefit most.
Development of their areas of the country lagged behind with
the result that serious social and economic imbalances began
to appear. By 1975, with the central plains economically
secure, it was necessary to turn attention to the other
25

regions and spread the new wealth to their residents as well
as make them more active participants in the development
process.
The fourth five-year development plan reflected this
change in thinking. Greater attention is now being paid to
social development. Whereas the first three plans had been
devoted tc developing the physical infrastructure necessary
to promote the growth, • the fourth plan was concerned with
correcting the gaps and imbalances that had occurred during
the economic boom of the 1960s.
The flan was designed to remedy a number of pressing
problems. The income and services disparities between city
and rural residents had t c be corrected, the population
increase had to be curbed, pressure on "-he city had to be
eased and , simultaneously, the provincial centers had to be
built up. Educational facilities had to be expanded into
remote areas. at the same time igh^ r education institu-
tions had to be modified to train the skilled manpower
needed in the new industries. To cove: - the expense of this
accelerated social development, budgetary allocations wer=
increased and ministerial efforts were integrated to improve
the ccuntry in a corcinated fashion.
As in ether developing countries, however, the chal-
lenges involved are enormous. Whereas developed nations have
had at least a century tc adjust to industrialization,
developing nations have had an avalanche of changes tc
contend with in the space cf a single generation. tradi-
tional methods for coping with new ideas and technologies
are inadequate. At the same time, techniques developed in
the west, and applied wholesale have often proven inefffec-
tive without severe and sometimes limiting adaptation. with
the inadequacy cf traditional methods and of inpropriate
technology imported from the west, thailand has had to
discover its own methods for implementing change.
26

The job of developing new strategies has also been frus-
trated by the complex nature of the task. Remedies must be
devised for problems which are constantly expanding and
mutating often laking solutions obsolete almost as quickly
as they are devised.
Despite the enormity of the job, far-reaching policies
have been implemented. All have been based on a number of
key conclusions about the basic nature of the Thai economy
and society and the directions in which it should be devel-
oped. For one, it is now accepted that thailand is an
agrarian country, rich in natural resources and that future
development must, be along lines that maintain agriculture as
the core sector. In addition, Thailand is a cohesive nation
with few divisive forces at work which means that its
stability in times cf stress is assured. With no faction-
alism or racial, or religious divisions, Thai leaders can
depend en unanimity in carrying out the development plans
they have devised.
It is also recognized that the efforts that went into
developing the infrastructure during the 1960s and early
1970s, and which are still being carried cut, created a
system of immediate communication and transportation with
all regions of the country. Thus, when a plan is finalized,
manpower can be mobilized immediately to implement it.
Moreover, it means that information can be disseminated
quickly and that the benefits of development are readily
perceived. With a populace attuned to new ideas, progress
can tak= place at mere rapid rate.
A closer examination of some key challenges which are
currently being addressed gives an idea of hew the problems
emerged, and the strategies which have been developed to
deal with them. It will aisc demonstrate how the basic atti-
tudes boted above affect the directions taken and will





Traditionally, Thais have preferred to have large fami-
lies. Mere children meant more hands -co till the fields and
harvest the crops. Also, in the days when a kingdom's
strength depended on the number of men it could field in
battle, it was imperative that its adult subjects have as
many children as possible. The men fought and the women and
children either travelled behind the lines to supply their
needs or stayed behind on the farms raising the crops to
feed the armies.
When a family became too large for the land to support,
the landless sons could clear forest areas for cultivation.
with plenty for all, the population could grow unchecked
except by natural causes; extra people couli easily be
accommodated.
But by he mid-1960s, it became clear that the population
vas growing too quickly. The advances made in immuniza-ior.
had served to eradicate many fatal disease. Infant mortality
had bean dramatically lowered and with new medicines avai-
lable the lifespan was being ex-ended. In the period
tetween 1937 and 1947 the population growth rate stood a-.
1.9 percent. Improvements in public health and rising
income eppert unities in the 1950s and 1960s raised that
figure to over three percent per year. In the 30 years
after Wcrld War II, the population jumped from an estimated
17.5 million to nearly 45 million people in 1979 making
Thailand cne of the world's 20 most populous nations. Table
I shews the growth rate of Thailand.
Had there been unlimited -rac-s of land, the population
could have been absorbed. But the available land was rapidly
being used to accommodate the growing numbers. Virgin
forests could no longer be felled without destroying
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overflew cf sons without, land to inherit but soon they too
began to feel th= pressures of overpopulation.
Clearly, large families were no longer a been; they were
a liability. rapid population growth was erasing the
advances being made by development agencies. Crop yields
might be increased, houses might be built, schools might be
erected in large numbers but the gains were barely keeping
up with demand.
It was imperative that the government adept a course for
curbing the burgeoning population. In 1968, the cabinet
sanctioned the development of family planning services on
the research basis by the ministry of public health. Thais
was followed in March 1970 by the announcement of the
national populticn policy which led to the incorporation of




The slogan "aary children make you poor" and the
economic arguments fcr keeping the numbers of children at
two, found ready reception among both city and rural popula-
tions. Parents, hard-pressed to support -heir families,
began to go to district health centers for advice on contra-
ceptive devices. By 1974, it was estimated that 25 percent
cf all fertile married couples were using modern contracep-
tives, one of the highest percentages for developing
countries. The result was that the goal cf reducing the
population growth rate from ever three percent to 2.5
percent was reached ty the end of third plan in 1976.
The success of the programs can be attributed to a
number of factors. One was the existance of a we 11-
develcped network of state health service centers,
particularly in the central and lower northern regions where
the programme had the highest response.
Another majcr factor has been zhe attribute of the
public health ministry in welcoming non- ministry and non-
governmental agencies* offers to extend the program into
regions not yet covered by the government's own teams. Among
the mest active of the numerous public, international and
private agencies are the planned parenthood association of
Thailand (PFAT) founded in 1970 and the community based
family planning services (CBFPS) formed in 197U. the ebfes
has recently expanded its service to include family health
care and education in the belief that family planning
involves mere than simply reducing population increases.
Instead, it means ensuring that good health is maintained
through teaching villagers the basic concepts of nutrition,
sanitation and disease prevention.
The fourth plan gave priority to expanding family plan-
ning education and health service facilities into remote
areas. by 1979, the population growth rate had been reduced
to 2.2 percent toward the goal of 2.1 percent by 1981. The
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end result will be a stable population that will allow -.he
government to make headway in its efforts to bring improved
standards cf living tc all.
E. EEOCaTICN
Until the 20th century, education was for royalty or for
monks. Erinces had tc be literate to govern their provinces
and communicate with the palace in the capital. Monks had tc
know how to read the religious texts from which -hey
preached sermons to the laity. The rest of the scciety was
comprised cf farmers who had little need for reading skills,
village lore being trans mitred orally.
With the 20th century came creation of a widespread
bureaucracy with a need for educated men to staff it. Ycuna
men, reccqnizi.ng that the bureaucracy marked a new ladder by
which they mic ht rise in social and economic status, sought
cut monks to teach them the skills they would reed to
function as civil servants.
The second. half of the 20th century has brought a r.ew
importance to education as the path tc advancement. Ir.
village affairs where farmers are coming intc contact with
new technology- mcst cf it written and requiring a technical
sophistication beyond the ken of traditional temple schocis
education has taken en a new urgency.
The government has been faced with the massive task of
training these young men and women in the shortest time
possible. At the same time, it has had to create institu-
tions tc teach the specialized skills required by the
industry such as engineering, computer technology,
environmental engineering, nursing and medicine.
In 1560, only four million children were being educated
in government schocis. Today more than eight irillicn
students are enrolled in government primary and secondary
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schools throughout the country. As a result, Thailand can
boast an adult literacy rate of over 85 percent. Nearly 80
percent of the population above the age of 11 has had some
schooling and nearly 90 percent of children between the ages
of seven to ten attend primary school. Table II shows the
TABLE II



































increase in primary and secondary school enrollments while
table III shews enrollment increases in universities.
Despite the regional disparities in educational stan-
dards and facilities, the teacher- pupil ratio in primary
schools has improved dramatically to on teacher for every 32
pupils in the northeast, 28 in the north and 26 in the
central and southern regions.
Cver the past few years, the government has also Tiade
efforts to adapt the educational system to the development
needs of the country. Agricultural and technical schools to
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Chiang Mai University Chiang Mai
Khon Kaen University Khon Kaen
Prince of Songkhla
University Songkhla 533 1.059
King Mongkut Institute
of Technology _« 1,503 3,575
Srinakarinvirot University * 10,784 21.044
TOTAL 53,467' 136.26J 1
teen given priority ever many other programmes in the fourth
plan. Practical agriculture instruction has been introduced
in a number of forms at various levels of schools to bring
non-formal vocational education -o rural youth have been
intrduced during the recent plan period.
The fourth plan also emphasized non-formal and voca-
tional planning trainning to mee- the needs of the labour
market. Special training services have been devised to
provide skills to fcur main groups: low income groups in
urban and rural areas, new labour market, entrants, the unem-
ployed whose skills are not in demand in the labour market
and the categories cf people such as convicts, destitutes
and prostitutes whe require skill to make them active
contributors to society (Ref. 5: p. 303].
In the urban areas, apprenticeship and on-the-job
training to develop industrial manpower resources is being
encouraged. Radio ard television are being used as means to
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extending ncc- formal education. They also serve as audio-
visual aids for primary and secondary schools.
Snail scale, lew cost educational proiects are also
being implemented. eld people are finding new roles as
caretakers in child care centers and public libraliss.
The tctal government expenditure on education for the
fourth plan period is set at 43,975 million bath. part of
that is being devoted to university education. At present
there are 12 universities and 35 teachers colleges in
Thailand, three-fourths of them built since 1960. In keeping
with a government plan to decentralize education, many univ-
ersities have been established in provincial centers or. a
status equal to universities in Bangkok. Thus, besides the
long-established Chiang-Mai university, there is the univer-
sity of Khcr. Kaen in the Nortneast and the prine of songkhla
university in the southern of Pattani, to name a few.
Thailand is one of the founder members of the Asian
Institute of Technology whose campus is located 25 miles
north of Eangkok. A number of Thai students are receiving
postgraduate education in specialized subjects formerly
offered only in the western countries.
At present the government is concentrating on full
education for all Thais. Now that schools have been estab-
lished and staffed in the main upcountry villages, efforts
are being made to bring education to those living in small,
remote villages far from daily contact with provincial
centers. Once the educational network has been expanded to
reach them, and once the population growth has been curbed
to the extent that a set school population has been estab-
lished, the dream cf 100 percent literacy and full-range,




Ir. accordance with the policy of broadening the base of
the economy., the government has been endeavouring tc expand
the range of e mploy lent opportunities. With unemployment
checked at five percent, the challenge is tc find new icbs
for a v»crk force which is expected to increase at a ra^e of
2.9 percent per year for the next decade.
In -he early 1970s, -he urban laoor force increased at
annual rate of 7.4 percent or fcur times faster than the
rural later force increase of 1.8 percent. unskilled labor
in the ncn-agr icultural sectors now accounts for 30 percent
cf the total working population.
Tcward the end cf the third plan, urban employment
opportunities declined as a result of the withdrawal cf th=>
us armed ferces. At that point, the rate cf urban labor
force increase dropped to six percent while that cf The
rural later force increased to about two percent.
The problem facing the government is to find employment
for urtan wcrkers. at the same it has to create jots in the
countryside to keep the rural population from migrating to
Eangkck where they depress the urban labor market by their
willingness to work fcr lower wages. These migrants, seme of
them farmers seeking off-season jobs and others wanting
permanent residence, also add to the urban burden as they
require housing and services to accomodate them.
Tc meet the protlem, the fourth plan has placed first
priority en rural investment as a means to developing agri-
culture and creating jobs. agribusiness industries which





Labor unions were first organized in Thailand after
world war 2. most were in the public utilities sector and
state enterprises. Their principal objective was to urge the
government to draw up labor legislation to protect the wcrk
force [Ref. 6: p. 281].
Ir 1956, the first comprehensive labor legislation was
promulgated. in compliance with the international labor
organization convention, the 1956 labor code stipulated the
working conditions and structures whereby the workers might
form unions and bargain collectively to settle disputes.
In 1965, the trade disputes act was promulgated and in
1972, the labor protection, minimum wage, workman 1 - compen-
sation fund and labor relations decrees were brought into
effect. There were limitations in each of these and the
government, recognizing this, passed the labor relations act
in 1975. The act provided greater freedom to organize unions
and initiate action to improve work conditions.
The primary issue at the heart of labor disputes has
been that of guaranteed wage increases to offset the rising
cost of living. Management has generally responded favorably
to work force initiatives and in most cases, collective
bargaining has brought about -he desired changes.
The department of labor has played a major role in
promoting labor relations. Not only has it successfully
arbitrated disputes, it has increased the number of unions
by educating workers on the benefits of union membership and
showing them how to establish their own organizations.
The level of participation in unions, however, remains
low. Although there are over 70,000 factories in thailand
the 168 registered unions had a registered membership of
only 80,000 workers in 1979. The number is increasing annu-
ally but it will take a great deal more organization before
the majority of workers are unionized.
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E. THE B0BAL-OREAN GAP
Most of the economic growth of the 1960s and early 1970s
cccured in the city. As a result, urbans areas experienced a
rapid increase in prosperity. Because industries were
city-based and required la rge supplies of water and power
as well as transpotation facilities, the bulk cf the govern-
ment efforts were devoted to massive construction projects
to support their growth. Development, efforts in the country-
side were concentrated primarily on construction cf major
arterials linking all the provincial centers and to large
hydroelectric dams tc power the new industries.
The result of the flurry of activity was an unbalanced
development. by the 1970s serious disparities had begun to
appear between the urban and the rural areas. Differences in
income, public services and governmental education and
development facilities became more pronounced. With the
economic stability cf the urban areas assured, the govern-
ment began tc take measures to remedy these disparities and
to involve rural Thais more in the development process. This
effort was tc foim the nucleus of the fourth plan.
The fourth plan concentration on rural development was
based en several realities. One was the recognitior that
whatever the eventual extent cf its industrialization,
Thailand was and would continue to be an agrarian nation. It
also recognized that for the nation as a whole to grew no
sector could be allcwed to lag behind out all had to be
developed at a pace egual to that of Bangkok.
West of Thailand's population is locateed in -he ccun-
trysice. Agricultural households account for 58 percent of
the total households in the country, with rural households
in ncn-agricultural activities totalling 24 percent as
against a figure of 18 percent for urban families.
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While the nuirber of people in the agricultural sector is
imch higher per capita income is far lower. Thus, while in
1976, Eangkclc incomes averaged 19,154 baht, 34 percent of
the tctal population of Thailand was earning less than 4,900
taht per year. Though per capita figures do no- reflect the
produce farming families raise to feed themselves and though
farm household expenses are much lower than city living
costs, the disparity prompted goverment planners fc effect
measures tc improve the balance.
F. HAINTAISING SO VEBEIGNTT
The events cf recent years in indochina, have caused
thailand considerable concern. two problems which have
occupied the government have been insurgency and the large
number of refugees who have sought sanctuary in Thailand.
Insurgency has been dealt with by a tripartite policy of
removing the causes cf disaffection, concluding alliances
with neighbouring countries and by military containment in
sensitive areas.
One cf the detrimental effects of the development cf the
cities was that funds for development were concentrated on
the urban areas. The result was that many of the remote
areas were neglected. The people,, in their sense of abandon-
ment, were amenable tc arguments by subversive elements that
the government was not interested in their well- being and
that irore direct action was called for. As a result, a few
formed themselves into insurgent bands and began attacking
government installations.
The initial government response was a military one but
after several years a general recognition of the legitimacy
of their claims began to emerge. It was then that a policy
cf rectifying the reasons for dissatisfaction was adopted.
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Kany of the complaints centered on the villagers 1
feeling that they had been left out of the development
process. The government's response was tc build roads into
their areas, bring health care, educational facilities and
agriculture imprcvments to villages. Though the task is far
from complete, the policy has reaped considerable success
and insurgency has been reduced.
The government has also sought to cement alliances with
several countries which had have done much to remove the
infrastructural support to insurgents in areas in which the
government has not yet been able to undertake major
development efforts.
For -chose insurgents that remain, the government has
elected tc contain them military in remote areas.
Undertaking freguent campaigns to destroy their bases of
cperatioi and thus tc weaken them. It is felt that once
development projects have been implemented in all parts of
the country insurgency will cease.
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V. MANAGING ORGJNIZ ATIONAL CHANGS AND DEVELOPMENT
As we saw in previous chapter, organizations depend on
and mast interact with their external environment in crder
to survive. Any factor in the environment that interferes
with the organization 1 * ability to attract the hunar. and
material resources it needs, or to produce and market its
services cr products, become a force for change. Any factor
in the internal environment that effects the way the organi-
zation carries out its activities is also a force for
change.
A. FCRCES FOR CHANGE
1
• J.2£l2Hi Forces
There are numerous specific types of external force
for change. Increasing costs and scarcity of natural
resources, worker safety, higher levels of education, high-
interest rates-the list of environmental factors that have
changed cur lives in recents years goes on. An encrmcus
variety cf external forces, from technological advances, can
pressure organizations to modify their structure, goals, and
methods cf operation [Ref. 7: p. 159].
2- Internal Forces
Pressures for change may also arise from a number cf
sources within the organization, particuirly from new stra-
tegies, technologies, and subordinate attitudes and
behavior. For example, a top administrator's decision to
seek a higher rate cf long-term growth will affect the goals
cf many departments and may even lead to seme reorganiza-
tion. The introduction of automated equipment to perform
UO

tasks that previously required human work may call for a
complete change in work routines, training programs and
compensation arrangeuents.
External and internal forces for change are cften
linked. The link is particularly strong when changes in
values and attitudes are involved. Persons with new atti-
tudes enter the organization and cause it to change from
within.
E. PIANBED ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
Seme changes are unavoidable, but it is important to
recognize that many forces act to keep an organization in
state of eguilibruira. Force opposing change are alsc forces
supporting stability or in the "status quo".
To understand how pressure for change and pressures for
statitility interact, we will present a model that describes
how the level of behavior or perforaanca in any organization
is influenced by forces that push in oppposing directions.
Other models will shew how an organization, department, or
individual can be helped to change, and whether an organiza-
tion is likely to mobilize the energies necessary for
successful change.
According to the "force-field" theory of Kurt Lewin, any
behavior is the result of an equilibrium between driving and
restraining forces [ Bef . 8: p. 383]. The driving forces
push cne way, the restraining forces push the other. The
performance which energes is a reconciliation of the two
sets of forces. An increase in the driving force might
increase performance, but it might also increase the
restraining forces.
The natural tendency for most of us, if we want change,
is to push. However, the equally natural tendency of
whomever or whatever is being pushed is to push back:
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Erivirg forces activate their own restraining forces.
Decreasing the restraining forces, therefore, is normally a
more effective way.









Figure 5*1 Force-Field Diagram.
Lewis's model ( figure 5.1 ) reminds us to lock for
multiple causes of behavior rather than a single cause. It
is applicable tc our purposes because it is generalized:
The forces can oa of many types and the behavior or perfor-
mance can be that of an individual, group, cr entire
organization. The equilibrium concept also suggests that
organizations have forces that keep performance from falling
too lew, as well as forces that keep it from rising too
high.
Programs of planned change are directed toward removing
cr weakening the restraining forces and toward creating or
strengtening the driving forces that exist in organization.
C. THE EHOCFSS OF CBANGE
Lewin also studied the process of bringing about effec-
tive change. He noted that individuals experience two major
obstacles tc change. First, they are unwilling or unable to
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alter long- established attitudes and behavior. An officer
who is tcld that he or she needs to learn a new analytic
technique aay accept this information with little cr no
difficulty. But if that same officer is told that he cr she
is toe aggressive and abrasive in dealing with others, the
officer is much more likely to resent and reject the ir. for-
mation. Suggesting the need to make a change in
administrative style or attitude is perceived as violation
of one's self-image and an indication of inadequacy.
The secend major obstacle noted by Lewin was that change
frequently lasts only short time. After a brief period of
trying to do things differently, individuals often attempt
to rsturr tc their traditional pattern of behavior.
Tc overcome obstacles of this sort, Lewin developed a
three-step sequential model of the change process. the
model, later elaborated by 2dgar H. Schein and others, is
equally applicable to individuals, groups, or entire organi-
zations [Bef. 9: p. 155]. It involves "unfreezing" the
present behavior pattern, "changing" or developing a new
behavior patterns and then "ref reezeing" or reinforcing the
new behavior. See figure &2
1 . Unf r eez ir.g
Unfreezing involves making the need for change so obvious
that the individual, group, or organization can readily see
and accept it. Unfreezing might be accomplished by intro-
ducing new information to pinpoint discrepancies between
objectives and current performance, by decreasing the
strength cf old, inappropriate values, or by demonstrating
their lack of effectiveness. To some extent, unfreezing
occurs naturally in situations that are sufficiently unset-









Figure 5.2 The Process of Change.
2 . C ha n^i n.2
A trained change agent can play a particular valuable rcle
in the development cf new behavior patterns- In partnership
with organizational members, the changes agent helps create
situations in which cew values, attitudes, and behaviors
will be appropriate and also provides examples cf each.
These values, attitudes, and behavior are acquired by organ-
ization members through the processes of identification and
internalization. In identification, organization members
identify with the values and attitudes of the change agent,
modeling their behavior after that of change agent. In
internalization, organization members learn new values,
attitudes, and behaviors when they find themselves in
situations which require them for effective performance.
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3 . Befr eez i nq
Unfreezing means locking the new behavior pattern
into place by means cf supporting mechanisms. The indivi-
dual, the group, or organization that. has changed
experiences the benefits of the new behavior or structure.
Eraise, rewards, and other reinforcement by upper levels
play a large role during the initial stages of refreezing
behavicr in individuals. Wore effective performance, when
recognized and accepted, served the same purpose on an
organizational cr group level. Once refrozen, the new
behavior pattern becomes the new norm.
D. BESISTAHCE TO CH1NGS
A majcr cbstacle to the implementation of new policies,
goals, cr methods of operation is the resistance of
organization members to change.
1 • Sources of Resistance to change
That an outside change agent is often necessary for
the success cf programs is an indication of how strong such
resistance can be. There are three general scurces of
resistance tc change [Ref. 10: p. 107].
a. Uncertainty about the Causes and Effects of
Change.
Organization members may psychologically resist
change fcecause they wish to avoid uncertainty. Traditional
ways cf doing things offer precedents that guide members'
acticrs, and the consequences of established procedures are
at lease well known and predictable. Unwillingness to give
up tasks and relationships that are familiar may cause
resistance to change. So may realistic anticipation of
practical problems such as the need to learn new technology.
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t. Unwilling -co give up Existing Benefits.
While appropriate change should benefit the
organ izaticr. as a whole, it will not necessarily benefit
typesetters replaced by computerized typesetting system.
For seme individuals, the cost of change in terms of lost
power, prestige, salary, quality of work, or other benefits,
will not be sufficiently offset by the rewards of change.
c. Awareness of Weakness in the Changes Proposed.
Sometimes organization members will resist
change because they are aware of potential problems that
have apparently beer overlooked by the change initiators.
This form of resistance is obviously quite desirable.
Diffferent assessments of the situation represent a type of
desirable conflict that commanding officers should recognize
and use to make their change proposal more effective
[Ref. 11: p, 35]-
d. Slow Government Reaction
The Thai government has responded slowly to the computer
boom.
San Jose Mercury, Monday, March 7, 1983.
Eangkck, Thailand-Some Thais, Western-educated and impatient,
argue that the bocm is being muffled by a government
indifferent to the advantages high technology can offer a
developing nation. Eut anyone capable of seeing the jungle
for the palms finds the change barely short of stunning.
In offices where less than five years age busi-
ness was recorded in hand-written ledgers and on clattering
manual typewriters, the cream-colored boxes and glowing




In ill-equipped university labs and in teak
stilt houses on the edge of rice paddies, young Thais tinker
with integrated circuits and create software in the cciplex,
tonal Thai language.
The new, 32-story headquarters of Bangkok Ear.k is
completely controlled by computer-communications, air condi-
tioning, lights, fire alarms, public address and security
systens. And 90 of its 282 branches nationwide are linked by
computer etc.
To encourage this increase, several powerful
businessmen are pressuring the government to sharply lower
import taxes. With hardware taxed at U5% and software at
'\'\5%, the price of high-tech products in Thailand are far
higher than anywhere else in the region.
Businessmen and academics alike complain that
top government leaders have no undestanding of what
computers can do for Thailand.
"The reason the duties are so high is that they
treat hardware like stereos and software like foreign
movies-which they are trying to suppress," said Dr. Srisakdi
Charmcnman, advisor to the president of Bangkok Bank.
"They fail to realize that the real use of
computers in Thailand is to maximize our natural resources
and cui agricultural crops through the most advanced methods
of exploration, management, farming and marketing."
Srisakdi, who holds a Ph.D. in computations from
Georgia Institute of Technology, said that through the use
of technology, "3 % of the population in the United States
feeds the entire country. Eut in Thailand, 30 % are farmers
and they're barely able to meet our needs."
The small community of business leaders at the
forefront of Thailand's computer revolution-many of them,
like Srisakdi, with O.S. education or experience-believe
they can convince the government that long-term ' gains from
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allowing high technology to flow freely into the country
will far outweigh short-term tax income.
"The government is incredibly short-sightid,
"
said Cr- Pichai Buranascmbat, president of Bangkok Business
College. "The people at the top know nothing about computer
technology. " Pichai, who holds a doctorate from New York
University described. etc.
Dr. Suriyan Ti shyadhiga ma, a lecturer in elec-
trical engineering educated at the University of California
at Berkeley, decribed himself and a handful of colleagues
working ir small, dusty labs on primitive, hand-made eguipt-
mant as an "underground" movement.
"The government doesn't take us or cur work
seriously," Suriyan complained. "So in order to continue our
work in microprocessor software we've got to dig into cur
own pockets to buy eguipment."
But his cutlook was tinged with optimism. "We
feel that if we can produce something entirely indigincus
and worthwhile, that the government will begin to take us
ssricusly-ar.d increase our budget," he said. etc.
2 • Cver coming Re sista nce to Change
Resistance to a change proposal is a signal to
commanding officers tha^ something is wrong with the
proposal cr that mistakes have been made in its presenta-
tion. Commanding officers, therefore, must determine the
actual causes of resistance and then remain flexible enough
to overcome them in an appropriate manner.
Kotter and Schlesinger offer six ways of overcoming
resistance to change. Highly situation-dependent, these






















Commonly used when . . .
There is a lack of informa-
tion or inaccurate infor-
mation and analysis.
The initiators do not have
all the information they
need to design the
change, and others have
considerable power to re-
sist.
People are resisting be-
cause of adjustment
problems.
Some person or group
with considerable power
to resist will clearly lose
out in a change.
Other tactics will not
work, or are too expen-
sive.
Speed is essential , and




will often help implement
the change.
People who participate
will be committed to im-
plementing change, and
any relevant informa-
tion they have will be in-
tegrated into the change
plan.
No other approach works
as well with adjustment
problems.
Sometimes it is a rela-
tively easy way to avoid
major resistance.
It can be a relatively
quick and inexpensive so-
lution to resistance prob-
lems.
It is speedy and can
overcome any kind of
resistance.
Disadvantages
Can be very time-consuming
if many people are in-
volved.
Can be very time-consum-
ing if participators design
an Inappropriate change.
Can be time-consuming, ex-
pensive, and still fail.
Can be too expensive if it
alerts others to negotiate
for compliance.
Can lead to future prob-
lems if people feel manipu-
lated.
Can be risky if it leaves
people angry with the
initiators.
a. Education and Communication.
Cne of the most obvious ways to overcome resis-
tance tc change is t c inform people about the planned change
and the need for it early in the process. If the need for,
and lcgic of, the change are a xplained- whether individually
to subordinates , tc groups in meetings, or to entire organi-
zations through elaborate audiovisual education
campaigns-the road tc successful change may be smoother.
fc. Participation and Involvement
If potential resistors are drawn into the actual
design and i up le mentation of the change, it may be better
prepared as well as easier to effect. This was confirmed in
a classic study by Lester Ccch and John French, who found
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that resistance to change could be reduced or eliminated by
having those involved participate in the design of the
change [Bef. 12: p. 512]. Paul Lawrence came tc ^ircilsr
conclusions, suggesting that in order to avoid resistance,
commanding officers should take into account what he called
the sccial effects of change. For example, change incased
from above is likely to make people feel that their
knowledge and skills are being ignored [ Ref . 13: p. U].
c. Facilitation and Support
Easing the change process and providing support
for these caught up in it is another way commaningof f ic°r
can deal with resistance. Retraining programs, allowing
time off after a difficult period, and offering emotional
support and understanding may help.
d. Negotiation and Agreement
Another technique is negotiation with avowed or
potential resistors.
e. Manipulation and Co-optation
Sometimes commanding officers may covertly steer
individuals or groups away from resistance tc change. They
nay manipulate workers oy releasing information selectively
or by consciously structuring the sequence of events. Or
they cay co-opt an individual, perhaps a key person within a
group, by giving him or her a iesirable role in designing or
carrying out the change process. Aside from the doubtful
ethics of such technique, they may also backfire.
f. Explicit and Implicit Coercion
Commanding officers may force people tc gc
along with a change by explicit or implicit threats
involving less of jobs, lack of prcmotion, and the like.
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Commanding officers also dismiss transfer subordinates who
stand in the way cf change. As with manipulation and
co-optation, such methods, though not uncommon, are risky
and make it more difficult to gain support for future change
effort.
E. AiEBOACHES TO PLINNED CHANGE
Harold J. Leavitt states that an organization can be
changed by altering its structure, its technology, and/or
its people [Bef, 14: p. 55]. Changing the organization* s
structure involves rearranging its internal systems, such as
its lines cf communication, wort: flow, or administrative
hierarchy. Changing the organization's technology means
altering its equipment, engineering processes, rsseach tech-
niques. Changing the organization's people involves
changing ths selecticn, training, relationships, attitudes,
cr rcles cf organization members. Our main focus will be on
change efforts aimed at the people in the organization; in
particular, emphasizing on organizational development
programs, which attempt to change the ways people work
together to achieve the organization's and their own
objectives.
1 • I n t e rd e p gn d e n ce of the ^hree Approaches.
Organizations are made up of interacting, interde-
pendent elements under the influence of common forces; that
is , organizations are systems. The three elements-
structure, technology and people-are therefore highly
interdependent. A change in one is likely to affect the
ether elements as well. Thus, an effective change program
is likely to be one that acknowledges the interaction of
these three elements and attempts to change all three, as
necessary. Change programs that focus on only cne cf ths








Figure 5.3 Interdependent Organizational Elements.
2 • Structural Approach.
.
According to Leavitt, efforts tc bring about organi-
zational developments in structure can be divided into three
groups. In the first group are structural changes created
through the application of classical organizational design
principles. The classical theorists sought to improve the
performance of organizations by clearly and carefully
defining th a job responsibilities of organizations members.
They emphasized the creation of appropriate divisions of
subordinates and lines of authority.
Changing organizations through decentralization is
another structural approach to change. This approach is
based en the idea that creating smaller self-contained
organizational units will increase the motivation of the
members of those units and help them focus their attention
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en th€ hichest priority activities. The intended result is
improved performance for each unit. An added advantage of
decentralization is that it permits each unit to adapt its
own structure and technology to the tasks it performs and to
its external environment.
The third structural approach to change aims at
improving organi2aticnal performance by modifying the flow
of work in the organization. This approach is based en the
reasoning that proper work flow and grouping of specialties
will lead directly tc an improvement in productivity and are
likely tc inprove morale and work satisfaction, as well.
3- Technolq qical Ap pro ach
Systematic application of the technological approach
to change began with the work cf Frederick Taylor and his
scientific management. Taylor and his followers attempted
to analyze and refine the interactions between workers and
machines tc increase the efficiency in the workplace.
Through time and motion studies, setting piece rates, and
ether effcrts to redesign work operations and reward
systems, Taylor and later industrial engineers tried to
improve organizational performance.
Although technological changes are sometimes intro-
duced intc an organization without plans for changing the
organizational elements, they are often difficult tc imple-
ment successfully. A common problem with technological
change is that it often proves incompatible with the organi-
zation's structure. This incompatibility may create
resentment and dislocations among organization members.
a. Combining Technological and Structural Apprcach
Combined technological and structural approaches
to change attempt tc improve performance by changing seme




** • People A pproa che s
Ecth the technical and structural approaches attempt
to improve organizational performance by changing the wcrk
situation. They are based en the assumption that creating
an appropriate work situation will cause people behavior tc
become mere productive. The people approaches, on the ether
hand, attempt to change directly the behavior of people by
focusing en their skills, attitudes, perceptions, and
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Figure 5.4 The Three Change Approaches,
Figure 5.4 summarizes of the caange approaches,
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VI. FACTORS AFFICTIIG QRGAHIZATIOH DJ2VELOPMENT IN THI PUBLIC
SECTOR
A critical analysis of the applicability of OD in the
public sector has been developed by Robert T. Gclembiewski.
This essay entitled "organization development in public
agencies: perspectives on theory and practice" illustrates
the unique character of the public sector with its legisla-
tive and institutional constraints which make it more
difficult to achieve CD objectives.
He believe +here is much that can be learned from od
efforts in the private sector that has applicacability to
the public sector. There are a number of important const-
raints in the public sector that create unique problems
relative to the transferability of 0) technology.
Hcwever, we believe thera are important contingencies in
the public sector that tend to limit this transferability.
A. DIFFERENT MEASURES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
Although relating outcome variables such as profit-
ability, ccst reduction, turnover and the like to
improvement efforts is difficult in the private sector, the
problem is even more substantial in the public sector.
Without profit measures in the public sector , the external
change agent must learn to adapt to different measures of
effectiveness. Organizations such as government agencies,
hospitals and schools do net have clear-cut verificable
outputs that lend themselves to objective measurement
[Ref. 15: p. 235]. Most public sector organizations are
producing a product, largely intangible services, that is
not enly hard tc measure but also restricts quantitative
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feedback to the clients. It is simply difficult to demons-
trate tc the public that a large expenditure for an OD
effort is positively related to better public service.
Further, without this specific feedback from objective
measurements,, it may be harder for the OD consultant to
facilitate adaptive behavior by the organizational
participants.,
Thus, a major challenge to improvement efforts in the
public sector is tc develop and refine hard measures of
organizational effectiveness [Ref. 16: p. 35]. Examples of
possible effectiveness measures for public organizations
would bs the level cf a graduating high school class, ontime
missions at an airforce base, or the state of combat
readiness of an army combat unit.
E. RZGULATC3Y CCHSTBAINTS AND DIFFUSIOM OF POWER
In the private sector, the chief executives tend to be
the focus pcrfer in the organization and the external change
agent can better evaluate their need awareness and commit-
ment to ths objectives of the OD program. Although
coordination and management of the OD program is difficult
in the private sector, there is often even greater diffi-
culty in the public sector because chief executives. in
many cases, have limited power due to a complex system of
checks and balances which make it more difficult tc make
commitments en long-range programs. "This difference is the
traditions and/or law that require governments to define
their organization structure in detail by statute. Thus,
when a major change is desired, it must be done through the
political crocess.... " and effecting change through the
legislative and political processes requires strategies that
are different from the private sector [Ref. 17: p. 448].
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Inflexible and cumbersome budgeting processes in the
public sectcr may restrict the options of chief executives.
How money is budgeted and appropriated is determined by
legislative action. An OD proposal may require up tc two
years for coordination, staffing, and approval through
designated budget channels. 3y the time the review process
is complete, the original need awareness by the key offi-
cials cf the organization for an OD program may have changed
and/or there may have been major turnover in the executive
ranks.
C. CCNEITICNING OF EXECUTIVES IS THE PUBLIC SECTOR.
Chief executives in the public sectcr are conditioned
during their career to favor management styles that naximize
sources cf dcwnward ccntrcl owned by subordinates. Public
executives are conditioned, by the time they become middle
cr tcp managers, to follow the smallest detail cf legisla-
tion, policies, rules, and procedures. In addition to
progress upward in a public institution, the executives mus-4-
indicate a adding cf attitudes to fit the particular agency
affiliation. While this phenomenon is net unique tc the
public sectcr, the problem is intensified there. The
dysfunctional consequences of this mass-conditioning prccess
are attitudes by top executives that may be inccngruent with
the OE objectives of increasing the level cf self and group
responsibility in the decision-making process. An OD
intervention must then include this factor in its strategy.
E. THE AEMINISTBATI1E ORGANIZATION IS PUBLIC SECTOR
The fcrmal structure of the executive establishment is
similar tc the classic western prototype. Official responsi-
bilities are ranged hierarchically in a highly centralized
pyramid cf authority; functions and jurisdictions are
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delineated in a eurcpean-style ministry structure. wit hi::
thirteen ministries at the time cf this writing and at the
office cf the council of ministers, virtually all regular
government activities are consolidated. Military , police,
and judicial functions are administered by the ministries cf
defense, interior, and justice, respectively. Only six
administrative agencies which perform minor functions remain
outside the ministries.
At the apex of the hierrarchy is the council of minis-
ters, individually, as head of their respective ministries,
and collectively as the cabinet, the ministers determine
rational policy and direct the machinery of administration.
The prime minister has frequently retained for himself one
or more key ministerial pests in addition to the position of
premier. In the latter capacity, he is aided by various
staff agencies located in the the office of the council of
ministers. The staff resources of this office have recently
been augmented significantly by the transfer to it cf the
rudget function previously located in the ministry of
finance.
Internally, each ministry is organized in the conven-
tional pattern of departments, divisions, and sections, the
hierarchical status cf organization units is particularly
significant because of the prevailing system of personnel
classification, under which the organizational level of a
position, rather than specific duties, determines the incum-
bent *s civil service grade and salary. The hierarchical
level of all governmental units consequently must be clearly
identified. For this reason, agencies established outside
the ministries generally have been equivalent to that cf
departments. This also generates pressure for elevating the
organizational status of units and sometimes results in
structural anomalies. Thus, within the council of minis-
ters, which has the status of a ministry, two subdivisions
also have ministry status.
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Most ministries are of the holding-company type
containing a wide variety of public: functions. Within these
major subdivisions cf government are approximately three-
score departments. The latter are the primary units of
fiscal, personnel, and program management. Budgetary and
organizational coherence is achieved mainly at the depart-
ment level. Cn major policy matters; however, the
department head (director-general) is guided by the desires
cf his superiors. General administrative rules are simi-
larly issued as ministry regulations with cabinet approval.
Auxiliary services are centralized within the major subdivi-
sions. In each ministry a seperate department, and within
each department a seperate division provide central adminis-
trative "housekeeping" facilities for the parent unit. In
recent ysars, rudimentary staff organs have also appeared at
the ministry and department levels.,
An important share of the government's operations is
entrusted to the incorporated government enterprises.
Operationally independent cf the regular executive astab-
lishment are a large number of "government organizations"
which operate utilities, commercial and industrial enter-
prises and ether tyres of business. These units receive
their initial capital and other subventions from the govern-
ment's capital budget, and are expected, in turn, to remit
profits to the national treasury. In recent years the Thai
government has relied heavily cn these organizations for the
conduct cf economic development undertakings at present,
approximately 150 such ccrperations administer a wide
variety cf enterprises, ranging from the state railways to
the manufacture and distribution of glass, lacquerware,
tobacco, and batteries. The decrees establishing these
organizations place responsibility for each in one of the
ministries. In practice; however, the enterprises exempted
from the civil service laws and regular budgetary procedures
are substantially independent of ministry control.
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Lccal administration in the territorial subdivisions of
the kingdom is carried on mainly by officials of the central
government. Officers of the ministry of interior administer
the 71 regions and approximately 450 districts into which
the country is divided. A measure of local self-government
is possessed by the municipalities established under
national law. These have their own elective officials and
civil service, tut are supervised by the ministry cf inte-
rior and are variously dependent upon the central government
for financial support. Some decentralization of administra-
tive authority has been effected in recent years; but only a
limited ueasure of local self-determination has been
achieved.
E. THE EUBLIC SERVICE
Thailand's public service is a product of the combined
influence.- cf foreigi example, the immediate political envi-
ronment, and the changing values of a rapidly modernizing
society. Western concepts and techniques cf personnel
management are elaborated in legislation and rules governing
the public service. For over a guartar century, the career
service has been based on a modern civil service system,
throughout the mutations in forms of government and changes
in political leadership the apparatus of a permanent profes-
sional administrative officialdom has been preserved.
Indeed, the firmly established bureaucracy is one cf the
most stable institutions in the changing Thai society. As
in numerous other countries grouping toward a viable consti-
tutional order, the public service is in seme respects still
a captive of the regime. But unlike that of other revolu-
tionary regimes, it is not directly involved in the power
struggle. In the course of modern political development,
Thailand's successive governments have permitted the public
service to retain its separate institutional identity.
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Th€ bureaucracy * s role in Thai government is unobtru-
sively influential. Thai administrators possess little
discretionary power. They perform their tasks under close
executive direction--even on matters within their legal
competence. Ranking career cffcials are likely, for various
reasons, to seek a decision from political executives. In
the formulation of national policies, upper-level civil
servants perform a the major source of expertise and
rational standards for program development and policy deter-
mination. To a degree significantly beyond that of western
bureaucracies, the higher civil service in Thailand must
provide such guidance. The devolution of such responsi-
bility to career service is dictated by various factors. In
the absence of effectively independent interest groups,
professional organization, or academic resources, program
ideas and plans originate almost exclusively within the
public sectcr. Inside the government, considerable depen-
dence on the permanent corps of government official is
necessitated by political instability and the resulting
rotation cf ministers. Moreover, the nation's commit rrents
to modernization heighten dependence of political officials
en the expertise of the civil service. Which pesseses
virtually a monopoly cf competence in the civil affairs of
government. In 1957, thirteen of the fourteen ministers in
the cabinet were military men.
The public service is a profession of great prestige.
The earlier traditicn of respect for government officials
serving the king continues to confer eminent, though not
undiminished, status upon the modern constitutional bureauc-
racy. In modern Thailand, politics and the public service
have constituted the principal vehicles of social ascen-
dancy. Thus officials in upper levels of the career service
posses high social status. Over the years, careers in the
government have attracted the vast majority of college
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educated Thai. Until fairly recently, the sparsity cf
opportunity for professional livelihood outside the govern-
ment offered few alternatives. In the past few years,
increasing numbers cf graduates have been attracted tc more
remunerative careers in the expanding areas of industrial
and commercial enplovment.
1 • The nation al Civil S erv ice
The national civil service sysam is comprehenrisive
in scope, embracing all ministries, the field service, and
all career positions, including in addition to administra-
tive employees, teachers, professors, judges, military
officers, and police officials. All positions in the
regular service below the rank of deputy minister are
covered by provisions of the civil service laws. Only offi-
cials cf the go ver msntal enterprises and cf the autonomous
municipalities are excluded.
2 • I aisonn e 1 Man agement
Under the civil service act, personnel management is
entrusted tc a series of ex-officio comaision-ty ;e units
composed of ranking officials at each level of the hier-
archy. The act provides for a centralized review of
personnel practices by a national civil service commission.
This agency, headed by the prime minister, and composed of
ministry representatives, promulgates government- wide civil
service rules. Equipped with a small staff, it is legally
responsible for supervising ministry practices. In each
ministry, personnel actions are under the control of a civil
service sub commission composed of the minister, his deputy,
undersecretaries and the department heads. Similar staff
units serve each the departments, and in each of the
provinces a subc on mission composed of the provincial
governor and his principal subordinates is responsible for
civil service matters in the field service.
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Despite the legal authority given the central civil
service commission/ control over personnel management is
largely decentralized; the ministries and department heads
retain substantial operating independence in civil service
natters. Classification, selection, promotion, and discip-
line are conducted fcy the ministries nominally subject to
the policies and review of the commission. The latter's
supervisory role; however, is impaired by various political
and administrative limitations on its independence.
Political pressures may compel concessions to the ministries
in important instances. Deficiencies in organization and
staffing of the commission also curtail its influence. In
such matters as exceptions to classification or compensation
rules, the commission's power to grant or withhold approval
gives it considerable authority. However, much of its wcrk
consist cf procedural routines and a rather perfunctory
review cf ministry personnel actions.
3 • lllSJS Classification s
Under the system of rank classification alluded to
earlier, all positions in the regular civil service are
classified simply by hierarchical level and the eguivalent
grade rank. Only five position levels and grades are
employed, corresponding to the relatively small number of
organizational levels of the hierarchy. The grade and
salary received by officials is thus dependent en their
organizational level rather than on their duties. There is
no separate classification for professional or technical
positions under civil service regulations and criers;
various categories of such positions are eguated to parti-
cular hierarchical pests and are assigned the same grade
rank as the latter. The standard grades are also employed
in the military and judicial services; positions in the
latter are similarly assigned grades comparable tc these of
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the regular civil service. Thas the career ladder fcllcws
hierarchical lines. Advancement in rank both for generalist
and specialists is obtained only by promotion to supervisory
posts at the next higher level of the organization.
** • Eecruitment
As in many other non-western civil service systems,
the qualifications for various positions in Thailand's
public service are based largely on educational attainment.
Admission, placement, and salary are geared to the degree
and areas cf formal education. In the Thai public service,
two career pyramids are differentiated by educational
requirements. University graduates (including doctors,
engineers, and ether professionals) begin their careers as
third-grade officials and may aspire to the highest adminis-
trative level cf a ministry. Those who have completed only
secondary school enter the service as fourth-grade officers
and havs limited advancement prospacts. Particular special-
izations in college training are required for posts in the
various fields of government service. In the universities,
ail cf which are public institutions, the several faculties
train students for careers in specific ministries.
Officials cf the latter frequently serve as part-time
instuctcis in the related faculties, and curricula are
fitted to civil service examination. Possession cf the
rachelcr's degree is required for entrance to the service as
a third grade official. A postiuate degree entities the
holders tc a higher salary step within grade.
Becruitment normally is confined to pesitiens in the
two lewest grades; tests at higher levels are almost always
filled by promotion. The grade distribution for the entire
service has a bread base and a very narrow apex. Officials
in the lewest rank comprise approximately 85 per cent cf the
public service; less than 2 percent occupy the two highest
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grades. Typically , the official's career is confined tc a
single ministry. As a result of the political separatism
within the government, inter-ministry transfers are rare.
Recruitment is carried on directly by the ministries
and departments under uniform rules and standards estab-
lished by the civil service commission. The rules require
the use cf open competitive examiniations for selection.
Under regular procedure, applicants for fourth grade posi-
tions sit for a written test cf general knowledges and
clerical work, supplemented by an oral test.
5 • S^SIiSsiSJi Pr cced ure s
Promotion procedures permit executives even broader discre-
tion, although some type of formal examination is legally
reguired for advancement, in practice, promotion is the
preogative cf superiors. The examination is often perfunc-
tory. Advancement tc the second and first grade is obtained
en the recommendation of the department head cr the ministry
under secretary and the approval cf the ministry civil
service subcommission. Advancement to the next higher rank
may b€ achieved ever, in the absence of a position vacancy
when an official reachs the salary bracket of the higher
rank through merit salary increments. The special grade is
conferred by the cabinet on recommendation of the minister.
For the vast majority cf civil servants, progress up the
career ladder is largely contingent on the suppor*- of
department cr ministry heads.
6 • 2 a 1 a ry S cal e
s
Civil service salaries censist of a base pay plus a
cost-cf-living allowance, both cf which are legally
prescribed fcr all grades and for the several steps within
each grade. General increases of salary schedules have been
effected by raising the cost-cf-living allowance rather than
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the case pay; as a result of successive revisions, the
cost-of-living increment now constitutes the major portion
of the civil servant's salary. Annual merit increases,
which are virtually automatic, normally consist cf salary
advancement to the next step-within-grade. But the minister
may approve an increase of more than one step for special
reasons.
Current salary scales are quite generally acknow-
ledged to be sericusly inadequate, particularly since
inflation has decreased real wages. The beginning salary
for a university graduate entering the service as a third-
grade official is insufficient for a reasonably adequate
standard cf living. Salaries of government employees are
supplemented by rather considerable prerequisites. Numerous
"fringe benefits" include hospital care, education allow-
ances fcr cne*s children tuition in private schcols,
eligibility for public housing, generous leave privileges,
and competitive opportunity fcr civil service scholarships
abroad. A relatively liberal retirement ana disability
pension scheme is also an important attraction of the public
service. After thirty years of service, an official may
retire en three-fifths of his current salary. But these
additional benefits cf government employment 3o not, of
course, compensate for inadequate salaries. "Numerous
employees in the lower ranks seek additional outside employ-
ment to sustain a decent standard of living. The low income
levels of civil servants and inequities in the pay differen-
tials cf lower ranks are widely regarded as a major cause of
discontent and corruption in the public service."
The Thai civil service has been subjected tc certain
legal disabilities cf public employment similar tc those in
American practice. Office holding in a political party,
part icapaticn in campaigns, and public demonstration of
support or opposition to candidates has been banned by
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cabinet order. This restriction has been conspicuously
ignored; however, in the case of political activity
supporting the party in the power.
7. Discipline.
An elaborate system of civil service discipline is
provided for by law. The civil service act lists specific
types cf prescribed conduct, and specifies the penalties,
ranging from reprimand to expulsion, for infractions. The
responsibility for disciplinary action is lodged with super-
visory officials under rules promulgated by the national
civil service commission. The latter also reviews all
discipline case; but such reviews are confined to a check on
the propriety of the procedure followed and the penalty
imposed.
Disciplinary measures are applied sparingly. Higher
officials are notablj reluctant to take such action against
erring subordinates, and when they do invoke such measures,
they are likely to impose inordinately mild penalties.
Minor offenses are cften dealt with simply threats to with-
hold annual merit increases. Yet a total of 2,5 19 cases was
reported in 19 5 7. The majsrity of these involved local
government officials. Where gross misconduct involves
violation of the criminal code, the case is turned ever tc
the prosecution department for legal action.
Disciplined civil servants have no recourse tc the
courts or to the civil service commission. They may appeal
disciplinary action only to higher executive officials.
Cases involving minor penalties may be submitted only tc the
next higher level of the hierarchy. In actions entailing
removal from the service. The ousted sfficial is authorized




VII. PBCBIEMS CF OBGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT IN THE PUBLIC
SERVICE
In the Thai public service, both career aspirations and
professional satisfaction are encumbered by limitations of
the political and administrative system. Constant inse-
curity anc recurrent frustration condition the perspectives
and performance of ambitious and conscientious administra-
tive officials. The most conspicuous problems of the public
service result from the shortcomings of personnel policy,
the political subversion of the merit system, and the
numerous obstacles to effective performance cf official
tasks.,
Major weaknesses in the organization and standards of
the career service have been noted earlier. Inequalities
and inadequacies in the classification and pay structures
generate understandable dissatisfaction. Gross disparities
in wcrk leads and responsibilities at comparable grade
level:? unfairly penalize devoted subordinates. Discontent
is heightened by the limited range cf career opportunities.
Since promotion normally is obtainable only by elevation to
a supervisory post, advancement prospects are severely
curtailed, although the proliferation of subdivisions inci-
dent to the recent expansion of government service has
improved the situation in recent years. Horizontal mobility
is similarly limited. Transfers to other ministries are
rare, generally confining the individual's career to a
single ministry in which he enters the service.
The most debilitating set-backs to an effective civil
service system in Thailand are doubtless the numerous incur-
sions cf political and personnel favoritism. Legal
subterfuge and extra-legal arrangements frequently
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circumvent elaborately prescribed procedures for protecting
the merit system in placement, promotion, and ether
perscnnel actions. Ubiquitous partisanship is a dominant
fact of life in Thai public service. Although considerable
prof essicnalization cf the service has been achieved, the
career opportunities of the civil servant are subject to
capricious political and personal influences. Recurrent
subversion of the merit principle through evasion and
contravention of the civil service law and rules have
stunted the growth of protective traditions.
Jet security fcr the vast majority of officials,
nevertheless, hss been assured up to now by the steadily
expanding need fcr the limited number of trained personnel.
But the sizeable current increase in university-educated
aspirants tc careers in the government has already intensi-
fied the pressure en civil service placement. Although a
decline in public esteem has toppled the public service from
its fcrmer heights cf prestige, it remains for various
reasons the career objective of the majority of ecliege
students.
Within the service, career advancement generally
reguires the personal support of superiors or the political
leverage of influential relatives or friends. Such suppcrt
is also essential to obtaining prefered assignments.
Favored officials may obtain normally difficult transfers to
ether ministries for the purpose of advancement. In some
instances, political executives may arrange through ccilu-
sion fcr a temporary transfer of such officials to a higher
level pest in another service-such as the police-with
subsequent return in grade to the original ministry.
Favoratism is particularly conspicuous at the top levels
cf the departments and ministries where it has induced the
close identification of political and administrative offi-
cials. Many civil service posts at these levels are
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allocated as a reward for partisan loyalty and service.
Tenure in these positions; however, is consequently scnswhat
precarious. A change of regime is likely to result in the
removal of incumbents who are out of favor with the new
leadership, or whose position is needed for another with a
stronger claim of reward. In these cases the salaries of
incumbents are not terminated. Replaced officials may be
transferred, pensioned, or simply attached to the ministry
cr department without portfolio. Nor is the rotation gener-
ally government-wide . Typically, only a few crucial pests
are affected initially; additional displacement takes over a
long period. Thus the transfer of power following the 1957
coup d*etat resulted in the immediate replacement cf only a
small number of department heads, mainly in police, public
relations, and army departments. Such practices, it should
fce ncted, constitute forceful pressure for the creation of
additional positions and the continuing expansion cf the
civil service.
The politically inspired removal of career officials is
qenerally a threat only to those occupying top-ranking
posts. Eut at all levels the opportunities and encluments
cf civil servants ars subject to uncertainties stemming from
ether deficiencies of the system. An individual's reclassi-
ficaticn cr prcmcticr, however meritorious, may depend on
the influence his department head or minister can bring to
bear at the particular time on the civil service commission
cr the ministry of finance. Thus progress up the career
ladder and ether rewards are sometimas contingent not only
en the inclination but on the varying ability and influence
cf th€ respective agency heads. Legal entitlement to
certain prerequisites provides no assurance these will be
received. Budgetary stringencies may result in the denial
cf merit salary increases in a particular ministry, cr cr in
the suspension of hcusing or other fringe benefits. Such
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uncertainties exact a high toll of insecurity an-! anxiety
despite a cultural predisposition against disquietude.
On the job, the civil servant's professional stake in
effective administrative performance is jeopardized by the
vagaries in public pclicy, operating standards, and poli-
tical leadership- The oppressive weight cf operating
difficulties stifles initiative, dissipates energies, and
frustrates the hcpes cf conscientious careerists.
Inconstancy and ambiguity in programs and policies
envelope administrative objectives and criteria in a fcg of
uncertainty. At best, the brief tenure of ministers gives
rise tc frequent charge in ministry policy and direction.
In the absence cf a binding rule the law, the characteristic
particularism a rd individualism of the Thai culture have
free reign in the sphere of public administration.
Standards of law enforcement are variable and subjective.
Established rulss may yield to prerogative in particular
cases where political executives choose tc side-step
existing policy.
The sense of direction administrators entrusted with the
development and implementation cf government programs is
similarly blunte by a lack of clarity and continuity in
national goals. Consensus on such goals is impeded by the
inper lanence of governments and the divergent purposes of
various elements within the politically fragmented leader-
ship. Although economic development is espoused as a
long-range objective, the formulation of a national economic
plan has been handicapped by the competing claims of various
sectors of the government for alternative development
schemes.
lacking deperdable operating guidepcsts, civil servants
cauticusly feel their way, divining purpose from the immed-
iate and often personal objectives of their superiors. The
values of consistency and predictability in administration
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determinations are subordinated tc the necessities of impro-
visation. Professional norms yield to the contingent stan-
dards of transient political direction. For the ambitious,
program enthusiasms are realistically tempered by personal
career aspirations. The fluidity of policy and power
disocurage lasting personal commitments to either policy
goals or particular political leaders.
For a small but growing number of achievement-oriented
careerists, and particularly the western-trained contin-
gents, such conditions pose difficult professional problems.
The waywardness and feebleness of political superiors
subject these officials to continuing disappointment and
frustration. The strain of reconciling unstable and unsound
policy direction with high administrative standards is
evident in the exasperated complaints of civil servants.
The floundering of successive governments in crisis situa-
tions has aggravated such concerns. Among these officials,
the cultural tradition- of respect for superiors has been
seriously impaired. while the superficial forms of cbse-
quios deference are retained the disaffection of responsible
civil servants in a significant sector of the bureaucracy is
unmistakable.
Eut discontented officials have virtually no recourse tc
means of alleviating the situation. Overt disagreement or
pressure for change would be futile as well as dis
respectful. Resignation is scarcely feasible in view of the
limited employment alternatives. Discontent sometimes finds
expression in mere discreet and subtle forms. Aggrieved
civil servants occasionally communicate complaints tc poli-
tical leaders or press in the form of anonymous letters.
But, typically, the professional disappointments and dismay
cf administrators are suffered in silence. The result;




A. THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PUBLIC
The subservient character of the thai bureaucracy's rcle
in gcvcrnnent has been noted earlier. Confinement of the
civil service to such a role is assured by both official
instruments cf contrcl and unofficial mechanisms of rest-
raint. The bureaucracy's accountability is enforced mainly
by legal sections, executive controls, and the social
system.
Formal legal ccntrols are imposed en the exercise of
administrative authority by constitutional and statutory
strictures. The constitution explicitly prohibits any
govsrmental restaint imposed by other than legally exercised
authority. The citi2en's right to sue the government for
acts cf its officials is specailly guaranteed, exempting
enly the king from the legal process. Government agencies
and officials are thus subject to prosecution for illegal
conduct or accidentally damages. Jurisdiction over such
cases is entrusted to the regular law courts, as in the
anglc-amerioan systeir. A substant aill y independent judi-
ciary ais available to the citizens for the enforcement of
their rights against illegal or arbitrary official action.
Interference by the government in cases before the courts is
relatively rare.
These legal remedies; however, are seldom scught by
private citizens. For various reasons, the latter are
reluctant to file suits against government officials to
restrain illegal administrative action. Such reluctance may
be attributed in part to the persistence cf the traditional
absolutist conception of government exemption from legal
process; in part it is doubtless due also to the costliness
and delays cf litigation. Court action against the govern-
ment is confined almost exclusively to suits by foreign
commercial firms. Individuals victimized by illegal or
73

arbitrary action scnetimes informally report the cas= tc
higher officials with the hope that the latter will under-
take prosecution under the criminal cod-r. In cases of
property or personal damage, the citizen typically accepxs
an out-cf-ccurx settlement and cash payment.
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fill. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In this chapter, the possible solutions frcm the
author's point of view concerning the organization develop-
ment for use of developing the organization in the public
sector are discussed.
In the previous chapter we have seen the barriers that
caus€<f the development cf the public sector to move slowly
and ineffectively. By considering these carefully wa will
knowwhich conflicts are most likely among the systems and
their interrelationships.
A. OPERATIONAL JRINCIPLFS FOR MACROSYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
In the intra system, OD reduces in practice tc work with
small units and =; ver. individuals, so does macrosystem work
reduce largely tc intergioup activities. The OD consultant
assists members frcs different systems to understand the
effects cf irtersystim strectyping, competition, communica-
tion and eventually assisting to build collaboration based
upon new images held by each system of the other. Without
these clarifications in regard to goals and intentions a
supercr dinate systeii could well inhibit intentions cf a
subordinate system tc modify its efforts of a subordinate
system to modify its procedures. For example, line officers
as noted earlier, holding an image of personnel f avert ism
could continue tc expect behaviors cf that type.
A description of macrosystem that could be applied using
with Thai's organization is that:
"The use of social science interventions both within and
between the systems which clarify intersystem perceptions





E. DEVEICEMENT OF INTERNAL CHANGE
A requisite for macrosystem OD is that the consultant be
constantly aware ttat his primary client system does not
exist in isolation. It should focus on both internal system
dynamics and intersystem dynamics and call attention to
those areas that need to be worked on in order that the
various systems can accomplish their objectives without
interference and with as. much synergy as possible.
1 - Start with the Felt Need and at the Level of System
Jeadiness.
Seme OD consultants refuse to begin with the client
organization unless they can start at the top, and usually
with a diagnostic-feedback procedure. In macrosystem work,
however, this principle may have to bend a little. Among
sets cf systems it may not be readily ascertained as to
which constitutes the top. More important may ba the under-
standing cf how influence is exerted on a specific issue, or
the ways in which coalitions are formed to achieve cemmon
goals.
2 • Wcrking wi t h Admi n istra tors Wh o See_m Favor able to
Plan Change
An important guideline that would benefit ail change
agents in the development of strategy is the principle of
working with the people in the organization who are suppor-
tive cf change amd improvement, rather than working against
those whe are defensive and resistant.
As described earlier, the most conspicous problems
cf psrscnnel in the Thai's public service result frcm the
shortcomings of administrative policy. Inconsistency and
ambiguity in prcgrairs and policies envelope administrative
objectives and criteria in a fog of uncertainty. In crder to
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overcome these problems, OD consultants should set their
programs in clear relationship to stated objectives to
induce administrators to create and clarify the specific
objectives of the organization and show the importance of
those objectives effecting the organization.
A major weakness in the organization and standards
cf career service, as noted earlier, is the inequality and
inadequacy in the classification and pay scale structures
which generate dissatisfaction among subordinates. Gross
disparities in wcrk leads and responsibilities a* comparable
grade levels unfairly penalize devoted subordinates. In the
role of CD consultant, one should try to address of this
situation as fast as possible. Inequalities in pay and
workloads cause a major problems among subordinates. The
subordinates who lack energy and aspiration to work cause
the organization to develop with a snail's pace.
Administrators may net realize about the degree of dissatis-
faction aircng subordinates. Consequently, OD programs should
facilitate the ability of the administrator to analyze and
to solve problems.
If we consider the promotion system we will often
see that discontent among subordinates is heightened by the
limited range cf career opportunities. Since promotion
normally is obtainable only by elevation tc supervisory
posts and advancement prospects are severely curtailed,
favortism is particularly conspicuous at the top levels of
the departments and ministries. Many civil service pests at
these levels are allocated as a reward for partisan loyalty
and service, within the service, career advancement gener-
ally requires the personal support of superiors or the
political leverage cf influential relatives or friends. In
order to get rid of favortism, OD consultants should try to
induce commanding or chief executive officers to create the
standard cr criteria used as a tool to consider
subordinate's promotion with equality to everyone.
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As discussed in chapter 5, administrators r.ow lack
new technclcgica 1 knowledge causing resistance within the
organization, This is the case of computer technology in
Thailand. OD programs for the readiness of administrators
should include training in high technology at least tc the
point of educated faffiliarity. It will help the adminis-
trator understand the importance of new technology to
improve his own organization.
3 . Subordinates
.
In crder to follow the new technologies cf the
world, subordinates in the organization should have an
adequate standard of education and training. OD consultants
should develop stratsgys of learning the new technology and
motivate subordinates to have aspiration in working. Their
role is more of facilitator than action manager.
As discussed in chapter 7, the number cf western-
trained careerists disappointed and frustrated in the
unstable and unscund policy array is growing. Among these
officials, the cultural tradition of respect for superiors
has been seriously impaired. These young officers are trying
to go cut from the public sector to find jobs that premise
better position and higher salaries for them. The OD consul-
tant should work with them to promote their energy to wcrk
and to talk about the advantage of improvement in *heir
organization in the future.
4 • Int rasyste m De ve log merit
After working with commanding officers and subordi-
nates, CD consultants (in the author's opinion) should
create epportunitieser both of the groups so as to disscuss




As stated in chapter 7, discontented officials have
virtually nc direct recourse tc means of alleviating the
situation. Discontent sometimes find expression in discreet
and subtle farms. Aggrieved subordinates occasionally comp-
laint to political leaders or press in the form of anonymous
let t er s
.
The program of OD consultant should set the confron-
tation cf the commanding officers and subordinate so as to
stats the objective cf the organization, get rid cf discon-
tent feeling among then and solve the conflict at hand. This
program of the intrasystem intervention should be try
frequently. This process may consume time but consequent
results will create understanding between subordinates and
administrators and it will alleviate the tension in the
subordinates too.
C. IUTEBSYSTEX 2ROBIEM SOLVING
In this way the overall effort has reached out into
neighboring systems, particularly command units, at a time
when they ar c ready. It has taken time to get to this point.
In retrospect, it is doubtful that intersystem work could
have been seen relevant any earlier.
In this type of change the distance between the original
problem and the final solution is connected by a chain of
events, with each event forging the next decision, which
then becomes an event for the subsequent link, and so on
from the beginning problem to a completely unanticipated
final result.
1. CE Consultants and Inter syst ems.
In crder to accomplish solving the problems in the
macrcsystem, OD consultants of every system shculd wcrk
together so as to find out the common criteria in use for
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developing overall systems. The purpose of working together
is fccused en problems due to the lack of knowledge about
the intricacies of the organizational culture and the system
relationships. OD consultants, from the author's opinion,
should provide time to meet occasionally and plan their own
strategy.
2- Intersystsm among Tojj Administrators
After OD consultants have the chance to set the
common standards of procedure to develop system interven-
tions, top administrators of the system should have programs
to work with consultants.
The administrators should have common programs to
discuss their own problems cccured in the system a^d inter-
change ideas of how tc solve problems and how to develop the
organization. It is essential that the top administrator
attend the workshops and training too.
C. EXPECT RESISTANCE AND BE PREPARED TO HEET IT.
The larger the system, the mere probable it is that
there will be a numtsr of people present for any specific
intervention who dc net understand why they are there and
who, if they did understand, would prefer not to be. Mere
important were the ethical issues incived. Our broad-
spectrum solution has been to maintain complete openness
openness regarding cur goals and to offer participants the
cpticn cf abstaining from participation if they chose. With
increasing support from intrasystem and int ersystems, the




In the author's view there is an insufficient number of
organization development consultants who are trained to work
within the public sector in Thailand. Because of the formi-
dable effects of culture and tradition it seems imperative
that CD consultants be Thai, themselves. While westerners
might mean well they would all too easily be out off by
cultural factors.
1. It is recommended that Thai consultants be -rained
locally by outside consultants who would remain tc be
"shadow consultants" to the Thai
2. It seems wise to draw upon the experiences of ether
development efforts. What is happening in Korea,
Philippines and Indonesia might net work in Banakck. Or. the
ether hand it might be modi fie i and be made more useful than
what one would find in New York or the Pentagon.
3. Someone should record the history of the use cf CO in
Thailand. The work of everyone in the OD field would be
enriched by being told the history of OD in Thai organiza-






1. Clarence, H. H. , Bud ih ism A l±li2-t£^ cf Infinite,
Compassion, 1972.
2. Klausner, W. J., Conflict or Communication: Studifs in
Ih^i §M Western Culture, langTcox, 7"975
.
3. Matthews, E. S., The Land and People of Thailand, J. 3.
Lippir.cott, 19 64.
4. Cady, J. F., Southeast A^ia:
2i^l2E!£Il^r McGraw-HTTTT T364."
Irs Historical
5. Race, J., The Futur e of Thailand , Pacific Community,
6. Chandravithun, N., Labour R j= 1 a t ijpji s : Thail and' s
Experience, Bangkok Printing Enterprise, 1973.
7. Pater, F. D. , Manag ing in Turbuleni imes, Harcer &
S:w, 1980.
8. Kurt, L., Id orv in Social cience, Haroer,
1951.
9. Edcar, F. H. , Organ izat ional Development and :hanae,
St- Paul, 1980. ~ ~
10. Kotter, £. S. , Chossing Strategies for Ch ange ,
Schlessinger, 1973.
11. Robert, A. f Overcoming Resistance to Stabi lity ,
Business H crizcr.s, -!^ 7 0.
12. Lester, C., C ver com ing Resistance to Change, Human
Relation, 19487
13. Lawrence, C, How to Deal wit h Resistance,
McGraw-hill, 1966.
14. Harold, J. L., Applied Organization Change in
Industry, Business PuBlicatlons ,~"T9T"9\
82

15. Richard- A. S., Organization Development School,
Naticral Press Books7 ' 1y M
.
16. Jam^s, L. G., Organization, Business Publication,
197 3.
17. William,. F. G., Organization Change in Business and




Eunge, F. M. , Thailand: A Country Stud^, Headquarters,
Department of ths~'A"fmy, 798 1.~
Chu, V., Thailand Today. Thomas Y. Crowaii Company, 1968.
French, W. L. , Bell, C. H. , Jr. and Zawacki, R. A.,
Organization D evjl client , Business Publications, Inc., 1978.
Insor, D., Thailand: A political Social, and Economic
Analysis, Frederick IT Praeger ,~Tnc. , T¥53".""
Jolly, J. A. and Crsighton, J. W. , Tachnolocy Transfer in
Research and Develoomen£, Naval Pcstgraluate S"cnooT,""19T5.
Rigas, F. w.. Thailand: The ±lode nizat ion of a Bureaucratic
Polity, East-wast Center Press, T^So".
Sift in, W. J.. The Thai Bureaucracy, Institutional C hange
§£& Development , ETast r'we"st center Tress, T^ETF.
Stoner, J. A- ?., Management Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981.
Sutton, J. L.
,
Pro blems Of Politics ad A<i ministrat on
Thailand, Institute"""5r TraiSTncf" fGr" "Public Service, Tr.o'iana
"University, 1962.
Wendell, I. F, Cecil, H. B. f Jr. and Zawacki, R. A.,





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Csirercn Station
Alexandria, Virginia, 22314
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Pcsxgradua te School
Monterey, California, 93940
3. Department Chairnan, Code 54 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California, 93940
4. Professor R. A. IfcGonigal
<
Code 54Mb 10
Department of Administrative sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Erofessor J. W. Creighton, Code 54Cf 5
Department Of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
6. Lt.Jg. ?. Wa thanarcncha
i
3
75 Sci Searing. Sukumvit 107
Eangna, Banakok 1C260
Thailand
7. Personnel Decartient 1


















c. 1 The possibilities of
using organization de-
velopment technologies
in Thai culture.
20)794
' ''
E i58hw?
'MWC&XSSH
